Koopmans' axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet this criterion leads to hard-to-justify outcomes.
Introduction
How should we treat future generations? From a normative point of view, what are the present generation's obligations towards the future? What ethical criterion for intergenerational justice should be adopted if one seeks to respect the interests of future generations?
These questions can be approached and answered in at least two ways:
1. Through an axiomatic analysis one can investigate on what ethical conditions various criteria for intergenerational justice are based, and then proceed to evaluate the normative appeal of these conditions. 2. By considering different technological environments, one can explore the consequences of various criteria for intergenerational justice, and compare the properties of the intergenerational well-being streams that are generated.
It is consistent with Rawls' (1971) reflective equilibrium to do both: criteria for intergenerational justice should be judged both by the ethical conditions on which they build and by their consequences in specific technological environments. In particular, we may question the appropriateness of a criterion for intergenerational justice if it produces unacceptable outcomes in relevant technological environments. This view has been supported by many scholars, including Koopmans (1967) , Dasgupta and Heal (1979, p. 311) , and Atkinson (2001, p. 206) .
When evaluating long-term policies, economists usually suggest to maximize the sum of discounted utilities. On the one hand, such discounted utilitarianism has been given a solid axiomatic foundation by Koopmans (1960) . On the other hand, this criterion has ethically questionable implications when applied to economic models with resource constraints. This is demonstrated by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) in the so-called Dasgupta-Heal-Solow (DHS) model of capital accumulation and resource depletion Heal, 1974, 1979; Solow, 1974) , where discounted utilitarianism for any positive discount rate undermines the well-being of generations in far future, even if sustainable streams with non-decreasing well-being are feasible.
In this paper we revisit Koopmans' framework, with numerical representability, stationarity and sensitivity as its key features. In Section 2 we consider conditions that are sufficient to numerically represent the social welfare relation by means of a recursive social welfare function satisfying stationarity and sensitivity, thereby echoing the analysis of Koopmans (1960, Sections 3-7) . In this framework we introduce the equity condition ("Hammond Equity for the Future"), capturing the following ethical intuition: A sacrifice by the present generation leading to a uniform gain for all future generations cannot lead to a less desirable stream of well-being if the present remains better-off than the future even after the sacrifice. 1
In Section 3 we point out that "Hammond Equity for the Future" is weak, as it is implied by all the standard consequentialist equity conditions suggested in the literature. We show that adding this condition leads to a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions, where the well-being of the present generation is taken into account if and only if the future is better-off. Furthermore, we establish general existence by means of an algorithmic construction. Finally, we show that any member of this class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky's (1996) "sustainable preferences", namely "No Dictatorship of the Present" and "No Dictatorship of the Future". In a companion paper (Asheim and Mitra, 2008) it is demonstrated how a sustainable recursive social welfare function can be used to solve the distributional conflicts in the DHS model.
In Section 4 we offer results that identify which of the conditions used by Koopmans (1960) to axiomatize discounted utilitarianism is particularly questionable from an ethical perspective. The condition in question, referred to as "Independent Present" by us and listed as Postulate 3 a by Koopmans (1960, Section 14) , requires that the evaluation of two streams which differ during only the first two periods not depend on what the common continuation stream is. It is only by means of "Independent Present"-which in the words of Heal (2005) is "restrictive" 1 Our condition is inspired from Hammond's (1976) Equity condition, but -as we will see -it is weaker and has not only an egalitarian justification.
and "surely not innocent"-that Koopmans (1960, Section 14) moves beyond the recursive form to arrive at discounted utilitarianism. We single out "Independent Present" as the culprit by showing that the addition of this condition contradicts both "Hammond Equity for the Future" and the Chichilnisky (1996) conditions. All the proofs are relegated to an appendix. Koopmans (1960) has often been interpreted as presenting the definitive case for discounted utilitarianism. In Section 5 we discuss how our results contribute to a weakening of this impression, by exploring other avenues within the general setting of his approach. We also investigate the scope for our new equity condition "Hammond Equity for the Future" outside the Koopmans framework by not imposing that the social welfare relation is numerically representable.
Formal setting and basic result
Let R denote the set of real numbers and Z + the set of non-negative integers. Denote by 0 x = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x t , . . . , ) an infinite stream, where x t ∈ Y is a one-dimensional indicator of the well-being of generation t, and Y ⊆ R is a non-degenerate interval of admissible well-beings. 2 We will consider the set X of infinite streams bounded in well-being (see Koopmans, 1986b, p. 89) ; i.e., X is given by
By setting Y = [0, 1], this includes the important special case where
However, the formulation allows for cases where Y is not compact.
T -head and the T -tail of 0 x. Write con z = (z, z, . . . ) for the stream of a constant level 2 A more general framework is, as used by Koopmans (1960) , to assume that the well-being of generation t depends on an n-dimensional vector xt that takes on values in a connected set Y.
However, by representing the well-being of generation t by a scalar xt, we can focus on intergenerational issues. In doing so, we follow, e.g., Diamond (1965) , Svensson (1980) , Chichilnisky (1996) , Basu and Mitra (2003) and Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007) .
of well-being equal to z ∈ Y . Throughout this paper we assume that the indicator of well-being is at least ordinally measurable and level comparable across generations; Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1984) call this "level-plus comparability".
For all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X, we write 0 x ≥ 0 y if and only if x t ≥ y t for all t ∈ Z + , 0 x > 0 y if and only if 0 x ≥ 0 y and 0 x = 0 y, and 0 x 0 y if and only if x t > y t for all t ∈ Z + .
A social welfare relation (swr) is a binary relation on X, where for all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X, 0 x 0 y entails that 0 x is deemed socially at least as good as 0 y. Denote by ∼ and the symmetric and asymmetric parts of ; i.e., 0 x ∼ 0 y is equivalent to 0 x 0 y and 0 y 0 x and entails that 0 x is deemed socially indifferent to 0 y, while 0 x 0 y is equivalent to 0 x 0 y and ¬ 0 y 0 x and entails that 0 x is deemed socially preferred to 0 y.
All comparisons are made at time 0; hence, the notation T x T y where T , T ≥ 0 means 0 x 0 y where, for all t, x t = x T +t and y t = y T +t .
A social welfare function (swf) representing is a mapping W : X → R with the property that for all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X,
In the present section we impose conditions on the swr sufficient to obtain a numerical representation in terms of an swf with a recursive structure (see Proposition 2 below), similar to but not identical to Koopmans' (1960, Sections 3-7) .
To obtain a numerical representation, we impose two conditions.
Condition O (Order ) is complete and transitive.
Condition RC (Restricted Continuity) For all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X, if 0 x satisfies x t = z for all t ≥ 1, and { 0 x n } n∈N satisfies lim n→∞ sup t |x n t − x t | = 0 with, for each n ∈ N,
Condition RC is weaker than ordinary supnorm continuity.
Condition C (Continuity) For all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X, if 0 x n ∈ X for n ∈ N satisfy lim n→∞ sup t |x n t − x t | = 0 with, for each n ∈ N, ¬( 0 x n ≺ 0 y) (resp. ¬( 0 x n 0 y)),
Condition C is entailed by Koopmans' (1960) With the well-being of each generation t expressed by a one-dimensional indicator x t , it is uncontroversial to ensure through the following condition that a higher value of x t cannot lead to a socially less preferred stream.
Condition M is obviously implied by the "Strong Pareto" condition.
With condition M we need not impose Koopmans' (1960) extreme streams postulate (Postulate 5) and can consider the set of infinite streams bounded in well-being.
As the fifth and final condition of our basic representation result (Proposition 2), we impose the following efficiency condition.
To evaluate the implications of RD, consider the following three conditions.
Condition WS (Weak Sensitivity) There exist 0 x, 0 y, 0 z ∈ X such that (x 0 , 1 z)
Condition DF (Dictatorship of the Future) For all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X such that 0 x 0 y, there exist y,ȳ ∈ Y with y ≤ x t , y t ≤ȳ for all t ∈ Z + and T ∈ Z + such that, for To appreciate why we cannot replace RD with an even stronger efficiency condition, we refer to the analysis of Section 3 and the impossibility result of Proposition 4.
To state Proposition 2, we introduce the following notation:
is not a singleton}
where, for all U ∈ U, U (Y ) denotes the range of U , and the properties of the aggregator function V , (V.0)-(V.3), are as follows:
is increasing in w for given u.
(V.3) V (u, w) < w for u < w, and V (u, w) = w for u = w.
Proposition 2 The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) The swr satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, and RD.
(2) There exists a monotone swf W : X → R representing and satisfying, for
For a given representation W (with associated utility function U ) of an swr satisfying conditions O, RC, IF, M, and RD, we refer to U (x t ) as the utility of generation t and W ( 0 x) as the welfare derived from the infinite stream 0 x.
Hammond Equity for the Future
Discounted utilitarianism satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, and RD. Hence, these conditions do not by themselves prevent "Dictatorship of the Present", in the terminology of Chichilnisky (1996) .
Condition DP (Dictatorship of the Present) For all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X such that 0 x 0 y, there exist y,ȳ ∈ Y with y ≤ x t , y t ≤ȳ for all t ∈ Z + and T ∈ Z + such that, for
Condition NDP (No Dictatorship of the Present) Condition DP does not hold.
Condition NDP generalizes the other of Chichilnisky's (1996) two main axioms to our setting where we consider the set of infinite streams bounded in well-being.
We impose a weak new equity condition that ensures NDP. Combined with RC, this condition entails that the interest of the present are taken into account only if the present is worse-off than the future. Consider a stream (x, con z) having the property that well-being is constant from the second period on. For such a stream we may unequivocally say that, if x < z, then the present is worse-off than the future. Likewise, if x > z, then the present is better-off than the future.
Condition HEF (Hammond Equity for the Future) For all x, y, z, v ∈ Y , if
For streams where well-being is constant from the second period on, condition
HEF captures the idea of giving priority to an infinite number of future generations in the choice between alternatives where the future is worse-off compared to the present in both alternatives. If the present is better-off than the future and a sacrifice now leads to a uniform gain for all future generations, then such a transfer from the present to the future cannot lead to a less desirable stream, as long as the present remains better-off than the future.
To appreciate the weakness of condition HEF, consider first the standard "Hammond Equity" condition (Hammond, 1976 ) and a weak version of Lauwers' (1998) non-substitution condition.
Condition HE (Hammond Equity) For all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X, if 0 x and 0 y satisfy that there exists a pair τ , τ such that x τ > y τ > y τ > x τ and x t = y t for all t = τ ,
By assuming, in addition, that well-beings are at least cardinally measurable and fully comparable, we may also consider weak versions of the Lorenz Domination and Pigou-Dalton principles. Such equity conditions have been used in the setting of infinite streams by, e.g., Birchenhall and Grout (1979) , Asheim (1991), Fleurbaey and Michel (2001) , and Hari, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu (2007) .
3 Condition HEF was introduced in a predecessor to this paper (Asheim and Tungodden, 2004b) and has been analyzed by Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2007) and Banerjee (2006) .
Condition WLD (Weak Lorenz Domination) For all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X, if 0 x and 0 y are such that 0 y T −1 Lorenz dominates 0 x T −1 and T x = T y for some T > 1, then
Condition WPD (Weak Pigou-Dalton) For all 0 x, 0 y ∈ X, if 0 x and 0 y are such that there exist a positive number and a pair τ , τ satisfying x τ − = y τ ≥ y τ = x τ + and x t = y t for all t = τ , τ , then ¬( 0 x 0 y).
While it is clear that condition HEF is implied by WNS, it is perhaps less obvious that, under O and M, HEF is at least as weak as each of HE, WPD, and WLD.
Proposition 3 Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O and M. Then each of HE, WPD, and WLD implies HEF.
Note that condition HEF involves a comparison between a sacrifice by a single generation and a uniform gain for each member of an infinite set of generations that are worse-off. Hence, contrary to the standard "Hammond Equity" condition, if
well-beings are made (at least) cardinally measurable and fully comparable, then the transfer from the better-off present to the worse-off future specified in condition HEF increases the sum of well-beings for a sufficiently large number T of generations. This entails that condition HEF is implied by both WPD and WLD, independently of what specific cardinal scale of well-beings is imposed (provided that conditions O and M are satisfied). Hence, "Hammond Equity for the Future" can be endorsed from both an egalitarian and utilitarian point of view. In particular, condition HEF is weaker and more compelling than the standard "Hammond Equity" condition.
However, in line with the Diamond-Yaari impossibility result (Diamond, 1965) on the inconsistency of equity and efficiency conditions under continuity, 4 the equity condition HEF is in conflict with the following weak efficiency condition under RC.
Condition RS (Restricted Sensitivity) There exist x, z ∈ Y with x > z such that (x, con z) con z.
Condition SP implies condition RS, which in turn implies condition WS.
Proposition 4 There is no swr satisfying conditions RC, RS, and HEF.
Impossibility results arising from HEF are further explored in Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2007) . Here we concentrate on swrs that satisfy HEF. We note that it follows from Proposition 4 that RD is the strongest efficiency condition compatible with HEF under RC, when comparing streams (x, con z) where wellbeing is constant from the second period on with constant streams con z.
The following result establishes that "Dictatorship of the Present" is indeed ruled out by adding condition HEF to conditions O, RC, IF, and M.
Proposition 5 Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, and M.
Then HEF implies NDP.
How does the basic representation result of Proposition 2 change if we also impose condition HEF on an swr satisfying conditions O, RC, IF, M, and RD? To investigate this question, introduce the following notation:
where (V.3 ) is given as follows:
(V.3 ) V (u, w) < w for u < w, and V (u, w) = w for u ≥ w.
Proposition 6 The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) The swr satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, RD, and HEF.
tation of well-beings) is inconsistent with the efficiency condition SP given C. See also Basu and Mitra (2003) and Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) .
We refer to a mapping satisfying the property presented in statement (2) of Proposition 6 as a sustainable recursive swf. Proposition 6 does not address the question whether there exists a sustainable recursive swf for any U ∈ U I and V ∈ V S (U ). This question of existence is resolved through the following proposition, which also characterizes the asymptotic properties of such social welfare functions.
Proposition 7 For all U ∈ U I and V ∈ V S (U ), there exists a monotone mapping
By combining Propositions 6 and 7 we obtain our first main result.
Theorem 1 There exists a class of swrs satisfying conditions O, RC, IF, M, RD, and HEF.
The proof of the existence part of Proposition 7 is based on an algorithmic construction. For any 0 x ∈ X and each T ∈ Z + , consider the following finite sequence:
Define the mapping W σ : X → R by
In the proof of Proposition 7 we show that W σ is a sustainable recursive swf.
It is an open question whether W σ is the unique sustainable recursive swf given U ∈ U I and V ∈ V S (U ). As reported in the following proposition, we can show uniqueness if the aggregator function satisfies a condition introduced by Koopmans, Diamond, and Williamson (1964, p. 88) : V ∈ V(U ) satisfies the property of weak time perspective if there exists a continuous increasing transformation g : R → R such that g(w) − g(V (u, w)) is a non-decreasing function of w for given u.
Proposition 8 Let U ∈ U I and V ∈ V S (U ). If V satisfies the property of weak time perspective, then there exists a unique monotone mapping W : X → R satisfying
is defined by (W).
We have not been able to establish that the property of weak time perspective
follows from the conditions we have imposed. However, it is satisfied in special cases;
e.g., with V given by
where δ ∈ (0, 1). 5 We can also show that the set of supnorm continuous sustainable recursive swfs contains at most W σ . However, even though W σ is continuous in the weak sense implied by condition RC, it need not be supnorm continuous.
Once we drop one of the conditions RC, IF, and RD, and combine the remaining two conditions with O, M, and HEF, new possibilities open up. It is clear that:
• The mapping W : X → R defined by W ( 0 x) := lim inf t→∞ U (x t ) for some U ∈ U I represents an swr satisfying O, RC, IF, M, and HEF, but not RD.
5 Sustainable recursive swfs with aggregator function given by (2) are analyzed in the companion paper (Asheim and Mitra, 2008) . Note that an swr represented by such a sustainable recursive swf satisfies the following restricted form of the IP condition introduced in the next section:
For all 0x, 0y, 0z, 0v ∈ X such that (x0, x1, 2z), (y0, y1, 2z), (x0, x1, 2v), (y0, y1, 2v) are nondecreasing, (x0, x1, 2z) (y0, y1, 2z) if and only if (x0, x1, 2v) (y0, y1, 2v).
• The maximin swr satisfies O, RC, M, RD, and HEF, but not IF.
• 
Independent Present
The following condition is invoked as Postulate 3 a in Koopmans' (1960) characterization of discounted utilitarianism.
Condition IP requires that the evaluation of two streams differing only in the first two periods not depend on what the common continuation stream is. We suggest in this section that this condition may not be compelling, both through appeal to ethical intuition, and through formal results.
We suggest that it might be supported by ethical intuition to accept that the stream (1, 4, 5, 5, 5, . . . ) is socially better than (2, 2, 5, 5, 5, . . . ), while not accepting that (1, 4, 2, 2, 2, . . . ) is socially better than (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, . . . ). It is not obvious that we should treat the conflict between the worst-off and the second worst-off generation presented by the first comparison in the same manner as we treat the conflict between the worst-off and the best-off generation put forward by the second comparison.
Turn now to the formal results. Koopmans (1960) In the following proposition, we reproduce Koopmans' (1960) characterization of discounted utilitarianism within the formal setting of this paper. 7
Proposition 9 The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) The swr satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, WS, and IP.
(2) There exists a monotone swf W : X → R representing and satisfying, for some U ∈ U and δ ∈ (0, 1),
Strengthening WS to RD in statement (1) is equivalent to replacing U by U I in statement (2).
Furthermore, we note that the discounted utilitarian swf exists and is unique.
Proposition 10 For all U ∈ U and δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique monotone
This mapping, W δ , is defined by, for each 0 x ∈ X,
Propositions 9 and 10 have the following implication. 5 Concluding remarks Koopmans (1960) has often been interpreted as presenting the definitive case for discounted utilitarianism. In Sections 2 and 3 we have sought to weaken this impression by exploring other avenues within the general setting of his approach. In particular,
by not imposing condition IP, used by Koopmans (1960) to characterize discounted utilitarianism, we have been able to combine our new equity condition HEF with the essential features of the Koopmans framework: (a) numerical representability, (b) condition IF which includes Koopmans' stationarity postulate, and (c) sensitivity to the interests of the present generation. This leads to a non-empty class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions. We have argued that condition HEF is weak, as it is implied by all the standard consequentialist equity conditions suggested in the literature, yet strong enough to ensure that the Chichilnisky (1996) conditions are satisfied. In a companion paper (Asheim and Mitra, 2008) it is demonstrated how a sustainable recursive social welfare function can be used to resolve in an appealing way the interesting distributional conflicts that arise in the DHS model of capital accumulation and resource depletion. In particular, it leads to growth and development at first when capital is productive, while protecting the generations in the distant future from the grave consequences of discounting when the vanishing resource stock undermines capital productivity. The proof of this proposition employs the leximin and undiscounted utilitarian swrs for infinite streams that have been axiomatized in recent contributions (see Asheim and Tungodden, 2004a; Basu and Mitra, 2007; Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura, 2007) .
We end by making the observation that continuity is not simply a "technical" condition without ethical content. In a setting where RC (or a stronger continuity condition like C) is combined with RS (or a stronger efficiency condition like SP), it follows from Proposition 4 that condition HEF is not satisfied. Hence, on this basis one may claim that, in combination with a sufficiently strong efficiency condition, continuity rules out swfs that protect the interests of future generations by implying that the equity condition HEF does not hold. In the main analysis of this paper we have avoided the trade-off between continuity and numerical representability on the one hand, and the ability to impose the equity condition HEF on the other hand, by weakening the efficiency condition in an appropriate way.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Part I: WS implies NDF. Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O and WS. By WS, there exist 0 x, 0 y ∈ X with 1 x = 1 y such that 0 x 0 y. Let 0 z, 0 v ∈ X be given by 0 z = 0 v = 0 x. We have that, for any y,ȳ ∈ Y satisfying Suppose that WS does not hold, i.e., for all 0 x , 0 y ∈ X with 1 x = 1 y , we have that 0 x ∼ 0 y . Suppose 0 x, 0 y ∈ X are such that 0 x 0 y. Let 0 z, 0 v be arbitrary streams in X. We have that T −1 x ∼ (z T −1 , T x) for all T > 0 since WS does not hold. By IF and the above argument,
By invoking O and applying IF and the above argument repeatedly, it follows that 0 x ∼
This establishes DF, implying that NDF does not hold.
The following lemma is useful for proving Proposition 2 and subsequent results.
Lemma 1 Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O, RC, M. Then, for all 0 x ∈ X, there exists z ∈ Y such that con z ∼ 0 x. If condition RD is added, then z is unique.
Proof. Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O, RC, and M. By O, M, and the
By O and RC, con z ∼ 0 x. If condition RD is added, then by O, M, and RD we have that
so that inf{v ∈ Y | con v 0 x} = sup{v ∈ Y | con v 0 x} and z is unique.
Proof of Proposition 2. Part I: (1) 
is increasing in w for given u, establishing that V satisfies (V.2). By M, V (u, w) is nondecreasing in u for given w, establishing that V satisfies (V.1). Since ¬ ((x, con z) ≺ con v) (resp. ¬ ((x, con z) con v)) if and only if
RC implies that V satisfies (V.0). Finally, since
by invoking RD, it follows that V satisfies (V.3). Hence, V ∈ V(U ).
Part II: (2) implies (1). Assume that the monotone mapping W : X → R is an swf and satisfies, for some U ∈ U I and V ∈ V(U ),
Since the swr is represented by the swf W , it follows that satisfies O. Moreover, satisfies M since W is monotone, satisfies IF since V satisfies (V.2), and satisfies RD since U ∈ U I and V satisfies (V.3). The following argument shows that satisfies RC.
Let 0 x, 0 y ∈ X, and let x t = z for all t ≥ 1. Let 0 x n ∈ X for n ∈ N, with the property that lim n→∞ sup t |x n t − x t | = 0 and, for each n ∈ N, ¬( 0 x n ≺ 0 y). We have to show that ¬( 0 x ≺ 0 y), or equivalently, W ( 0 x) ≥ W ( 0 y). Define 0 (n) and (n) for n ∈ N by, for each n ∈ N, 0 (n) := max{0, x n 0 − x 0 } and (n) := max{0, sup t≥1 (x n t − x t )}, so that lim n→∞ 0 (n) = 0 and lim n→∞ (n) = 0. For each n ∈ N,
since W is monotone and represents , and ¬( 0 x n ≺ 0 y). This implies that
since U and V are continuous and lim n→∞ (n) = 0. The same kind of argument can be used to show that ¬( 0 x 0 y) if, for each n ∈ N, ¬( 0 x n 0 y).
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume x > y > v > z. We must show under O and M that each of HE, WLD, and WPD implies ¬ ((x, con z) (y, con v)).
Since x > y > v > z, there exist an integer T and utilities x , z ∈ Y satisfying y > x ≥ v > z > z and x − x = T (z − z).
By O (completeness) and HE, (x , z , con z) (x, con z), and by M, (y, con v) (x , z , con z). By O (transitivity), (y, con v) (x, con z).
Consider next WLD and WPD. Let 0 x 0 = (x, con z), and define 0 x n for n ∈ {1, . . . , T } inductively as follows:
By O (completeness) and WLD, 0 x T 0 x 0 , and by M, (y,
By O (completeness) and WPD, 0 x n 0 x n−1 for n ∈ {1, . . . , T }, and by M, (y, con v)
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose there exists an swr satisfying conditions RC, RS, and HEF.
Step 1: By RS, there exist x, z ∈ Y with x > z such that (x, con z) con z. Define a = x − z. We claim that there is b ∈ (0, a) such that
If not, ¬ ((x, con z) (z + b, con z)) for every b ∈ (0, a). By letting b → 0 and using RC,
. This contradicts (x, con z) con z and establishes our claim.
Step 2: For every c ∈ (0, b), noting that x > z + b > z + c > z, HEF implies ¬ ((x, con z) (z + b, con (z + c))). By letting c → 0 and using RC, we get
This contradicts the claim proved in Step 1, and establishes the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O, RC, M, IF, and HEF. Let 0 x, 0 y ∈ X satisfy 0 x 0 y, and let y,ȳ ∈ Y satisfy y ≤ x t , y t ≤ȳ for all t ∈ Z + . For any T ∈ Z + with x T −1 > y, Proposition 4 implies that (x T −1 , con y) con y would contradict RC and HEF. Since x T −1 ≥ y, it follows from O and M that (x T −1 , con y) ∼ con y for all T > 0. By IF and the above argument,
By invoking O and applying IF and the above argument repeatedly, ( 0 x T −1 , con y) ∼ con y for all T > 0. Likewise, ( 0 y T −1 , con y) ∼ con y for all T > 0.
This contradicts DP.
The following result is useful for the proof of Proposition 6.
Lemma 2 Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, RD, and HEF.
Then, for all 0 x ∈ X and T ∈ Z + , T x T +1 x.
Proof. Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, RD, and HEF. By the interpretation of T x, it is sufficient to show that 0 x 1 x. Suppose on the contrary that 0 x 1 x. By Lemma 1, there exist
where, by O, (3), and 0 x 1 x, it follows that z 0 > z
This contradicts condition O, ruling out this case.
This contradicts condition O, ruling out also this case.
Proof of Proposition 6. Part I: (1) implies (2). Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, RD, and HEF. By Proposition 2, the swr is represented by a monotone swf W : X → R satisfying, for some U ∈ U I and V ∈ V(U ),
) for all 0 x ∈ X and W ( con z) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y . It remains to be shown that V (u, w) = w for u > w, implying that V satisfies (V.3 ) and, thus, V ∈ V S (U ).
Since V (u, w) is non-decreasing in u for given w ∈ U (Y ) and V (u, w) = w for u = w, suppose that V (u, w) > w for some u, w ∈ U (Y ) with u > w. Since U ∈ U I , the properties of W imply that there exist x, z ∈ Y with x > z such that
Since the swr is represented by the swf W , it follows that (x, con z) con z. This contradicts Lemma 2.
Part II: (2) implies (1). Assume that the monotone mapping W : X → R is an swf and satisfies, for some U ∈ U I and V ∈ V S (U ), W ( 0 x) = V (U (x 0 ), W ( 1 x)) for all 0 x ∈ X and W ( con z) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y . By Proposition 2, it remains to be shown that the swr , represented by the swf W , satisfies HEF. We now provide this argument. Let x, y, z, v ∈ Y satisfy x > y > v > z. We have to show that ¬ ((x, con z) (y, con v)), or equivalently, W (x, con z) ≤ W (y, con v). By the properties of W ,
Proof of Proposition 7. Fix U ∈ U I and V ∈ V S (U ). The proof has two parts.
Assume that the monotone mapping W :
Hence, by Proposition 6, the swf W represents an swr satisfying O, RC, M, RD, IF, and HEF. By Lemma 1, for all 0 x ∈ X, there exists z ∈ Y such that con z ∼ 0 x.
By Lemma 2, W ( t x) is non-decreasing in t.
Step 1:
By the premise and the fact that U ∈ U I , there exists z ∈ Y satisfying
and T ≥ τ such that z > v := sup t≥T x t . By RD, O, and M, con z (v, con z) T x, and hence, by O, con z T x. However, since W ( t x) is non-decreasing in t, W ( T x) ≥ W ( τ x) ≥ U (z). This contradicts that W is an swf. Hence, W ( t x) is bounded above by lim sup t→∞ U (x t ), and the result follows since W ( t x) is non-decreasing in t.
Step 2: lim t→∞ W ( t x) ≥ lim inf t→∞ U (x t ). Suppose lim t→∞ W ( t x) < lim inf t→∞ U (x t ). By the premise and the fact that U ∈ U I , there exists z ∈ Y satisfying
and T ≥ 0 such that z < v := inf t≥T x t . By O, M, and RD, con z (z, con v) ≺ con v T x, and hence, by O, con z ≺ T x. However, since W ( t x) is non-decreasing in t, W ( T x) ≤ lim t→∞ W ( t x) ≤ U (z). This contradicts that W is an swf.
Step 3: lim t→∞ W ( t x) ≤ lim inf t→∞ U (x t ). Suppose lim t→∞ W ( t x) > lim inf t→∞ U (x t ). By Lemma 1, there exists, for all t ∈ Z + , z t ∈ Y such that con z t ∼ t x. Since U ∈ U I , z ∈ Y defined by z := lim t→∞ z t satisfies U (z) = lim t→∞ W ( t x). By the premise and the fact that U ∈ U I , there exists x ∈ Y satisfying lim inf t→∞ U (x t ) < U (x) < U (z) and a subsequence (x tτ , z tτ ) τ ∈Z+ such that, for all τ ∈ Z + , x tτ ≤ x < z tτ . Then
since z t is non-decreasing in t. By O, RC, and the definition of z, con z (x, con z). Since x < z, this contradicts RD.
Part II: Existence. Let 0 x ∈ X. This implies that there exist y,ȳ ∈ Y such that, for all
determined by (1).
Step 1: w(t, T ) is non-increasing in T for given t ≤ T . Given T ∈ Z + ,
by (1) and (V.3 ). Thus, applying (V.2), we have
Using (V.2) repeatedly, we obtain w(t, T + 1) ≤ w(t, T ) for all t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1} , which establishes that w(t, T ) is non-increasing in T for given t ≤ T .
Step 2: w(t, T ) is bounded below by U (y). By (1), (V.1), (V.2), and (V.3 ), w(T, T ) = lim inf t→∞ U (x t ) ≥ U (y), and for all t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1},
Hence, it follows by induction that w(t, T ) is bounded below by U (y).
Step 3: Definition and properties of W σ . By steps 1 and 2, lim T →∞ w(t, T ) exists for all t ∈ Z + . Define the mapping W σ : X → R by (W). We have that W σ is monotone by (1), (V.1), and (V.2). As w(0, T ) = V (U (x 0 ), w(1, T )) and V satisfies (V.0), we have that W σ ( 0 x) = V (U (x 0 ), W σ ( 1 x)). Finally, if 0 x = con z for some z ∈ Y , then it follows from (1) and (V.3 ) that w(t, T ) = U (z) for all T ∈ Z + and t ∈ {0, ..., T }, implying that
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose there exists a monotone mapping W : X → R satisfying W ( 0 y) = V (U (y 0 ), W ( 1 y)) for all 0 y ∈ X and W ( con z) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y such that W ( 0 x) = W σ ( 0 x). Since V satisfies the property of weak time perspective, there is a continuous increasing transformation g : R → R such that |g(W ( 0 x)) − g(W σ ( 0 x))| = > 0, and
for all T ∈ Z + . However this contradicts that, for all T ∈ Z + ,
by Proposition 7, since g is a continuous increasing transformation.
For the proofs of the results of Section 4, the following notation is useful, where 0 z = Part II: (2) implies (1). Assume that the monotone mapping W : X → R is an swf and satisfies, for some U ∈ U and δ ∈ (0, 1), W ( 0 x) = (1−δ)U (x 0 )+δW ( 1 x) for all 0 x ∈ X. Note that, for each U ∈ U and each δ ∈ (0, 1),
is an element of V(U ); hence,
Also, W ( con z) = (1 − δ)U (z) + δW ( con z) implies W ( con z) = U (z). Hence, by Proposition 2, if U ∈ U I , it remains to be shown that the swr , represented by the swf W , satisfies IP.
The following argument shows that satisfies IP.
Let 0 x, 0 y, 0 z, 0 v ∈ X, and let (x 0 , x 1 ) 0 z 1 (y 0 , y 1 ), or equivalently, W (x 0 , x 1 , 2 z) ≥ W (y 0 , y 1 , 2 z). We have to show that (x 0 , x 1 ) 0 v 1 (y 0 , y 1 ), or equivalently, W (x 0 , x 1 , 2 v) ≥ W (y 0 , y 1 , 2 v). By the properties of W , W (x 0 , x 1 , 2 z) − W (y 0 , y 1 , 2 z) = (1 − δ) U (x 0 ) − U (y 0 ) + δ U (x 1 ) − U (y 1 ) = W (x 0 , x 1 , 2 v) − W (y 0 , y 1 , 2 v) , since W ( 0 x ) = (1 − δ) U (x 0 ) + δU (x 1 ) + δ 2 W ( 2 x ) for all 0 x ∈ X.
If U ∈ U\U I , then above analysis goes through, except that it does not follow that the swr satisfies RD. Instead, the property that U (Y ) is not a singleton implies that swr satisfies WS.
Proof of Proposition 10. Fix U ∈ U and δ ∈ (0, 1), and let 0 x ∈ X, implying that there exist y,ȳ ∈ Y such that, for all t ∈ Z + , y ≤ x t ≤ȳ. 
Since w(t, T ) is non-increasing in T for given t ≤ T and bounded below by U (y), lim T →∞ w(t, T ) exists for all t ∈ Z + . Define the monotone mapping W δ : X → R by W δ ( 0 x) := lim T →∞ w(0, T ) = (1 − δ) ∞ t=0 δ t U (x t ) .
As w(0, T ) = (1 − δ)U (x 0 ) + δw(1, T ), we have that W δ ( 0 x) = (1 − δ)U (x 0 ) + δW δ ( 1 x).
Part II: Uniqueness. Suppose there exists a monotone mapping W : X → R satisfying W ( 0 y) = (1 − δ)U (y 0 ) + δW ( 1 y)) for all 0 y ∈ X such that W ( 0 x) = W δ ( 0 x). Since
for some T ∈ Z + . However this contradicts that, for all T ∈ Z + , U (y) = W ( con y) ≤ W ( T x) ≤ W ( conȳ ) = U (ȳ) (and likewise for W δ ( T x)) by the facts that W is monotone and W ( con z) = (1 − δ)U (z) + δW ( con z) implies W ( con z) = U (z).
Proof of Proposition 11. Assume that the swr satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, IP, and NDF. By Proposition 1, O, IF, and NDF imply WS. Hence, by Propositions 9 and 10, the swr is represented by W δ : X → R defined by, for each 0 x ∈ X,
for some U ∈ U and δ ∈ (0, 1). This implies DP, thus contradicting NDP.
Proof of Proposition 12. Asheim and Tungodden (2004a) , Basu and Mitra (2007) , and Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007) define different incomplete leximin and undiscounted utilitarian swrs, each of which is given an axiomatic characterization. Denote by one such incomplete swr. It can be verified that is reflexive, transitive and satisfies IF, SP, HEF (with (x, con z) (y, con v) if x > y > v > z), and IP. Completeness (and thereby condition O) can be satisfied by invoking Arrow's (1951) version of Szpilrajn's (1930) extension theorem (see also Svensson, 1980) . Since satisfies conditions SP and HEF (with (x, con z) (y, con v) if x > y > v > z), so will any completion. Since, for all 0 x, 0 y, 0 z ∈ X, (x 0 , x 1 ) 0 z 1 (y 0 , y 1 ) or (x 0 , x 1 ) 0 z 1 (y 0 , y 1 ), and satisfies IP, so will any completion. However, special care must be taken to ensure that the completion satisfies IF.
Consider X 2 0 = {( 0 x, 0 y) ∈ X 2 | x 0 = y 0 }, and invoke Arrow's (1951) version of Szpilrajn's (1930) extension theorem to complete on this subset of X 2 . For any ( 0 x, 0 y) ∈ X with 0 x = 0 y, let 0 x be at least as good as 0 y if and only if T x is at least as good as T y according to the completion of on X 2 0 , where T := min{t | x t = y t }. Since satisfies IF, this construction constitutes a complete swr satisfying IF.
